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Abstract. This paper analyses collusion by innovative firms and the impact
of patents in a continuous-time real options framework. Generalising earlier
research by Smets and Dixit and Pindyck, a patent-investment race model is
formulated in which innovative firms bargain and reach collusive agreements. It
is shown that, while collusion always delays innovation, it does not necessarily
delay competition. Depending on a number of factors, collusion can actually
accelerate competition.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the eﬀects of collusion within a duopoly. In our model, a
patent is granted to the first firm to innovate/invest which is then able to license
the technology to a second innovative firm.
Unlike previous studies of collusion, we use a stochastic model in which innova-
tors engage in irreversible lump sum investments and hence real options aﬀect the
timing of agents’ investment decisions. The impact of competition on the timing
of investment is then a key issue. This paper investigates whether collusion delays
or accelerates innovation and competition.1
We find that in the absence of patents, collusion always delays both innovation
and competition. When the first to invest can obtain a patent, the answer is more
complex and depends on parameter values. Before describing the implications of
a patent scheme on the collusive result, it is worth explaining the basic scenario
without the patent.
The non-cooperative version of our model was first analysed by Smets (1991).
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) presented the same model in a simplified form. Smets
analysed an asymmetric leader-follower equilibrium, where the threat of preemption
undercuts a firm’s ability to delay entry. Therefore, market entry by the leader is
accelerated and the option value of delay is eroded.
We are extremely grateful to John Brierley, Avinash Dixit, Bart Lambrecht, William Perraudin,
Ron Smith and Gylfi Zoega for helpful suggestions and discussions. All errors are our own. E-
mails: abreccia@econ.bbk.ac.uk, hsalgado@econ.bbk.ac.uk.
1As will become clearer later, by innovation we mean investment by the first innovative firm
to invest and, by competition, we mean investment by the second innovative firm to invest.
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We extend the Smets-Dixit-Pindyck model by allowing firms to bargain over a
long term collusive contract. A leader firm invests and shares monopolistic prof-
its with the idle firm.2 Collusion continues until the monopoly generates higher
profits than duopoly. The terms of the collusive agreement specify i) the leader’s
investment threshold — the timing of innovation, ii) the sharing rule, and iii) the
follower’s investment threshold — the competitive stage.
In general terms, cooperation results in an eﬃcient exploitation of the market by
the two firms,3 i.e. the value of the surplus generated by cooperation is maximised.
This is achieved because cooperation i) eliminates the preemption threat, and ii)
minimises the loss from competition. Also, either in a cooperative environment or a
non cooperative one, the follower pays the same investment cost, therefore whether
cooperation delays the follower’s entry purely depends on the slope of demand. It
is intuitive that, if demand has negative slope, cooperation delays the follower’s
threshold and, hence, competition.4 The reason why collusion delays innovation
as well as competition should be clear now. Thus, cooperation results in Pareto
eﬃciency.
When a patent is granted to the first innovative firm that files for a patent
and invests (the leader)5 and licenses the technology to the second innovative firm
(the follower), the first mover advantage increases proportionally to the licensing
fees. The licensing fee is introduced as a lump sum payment from the follower to
the leader. Moreover, the proposed patent scheme is flexible enough to take into
account legal and/or administrative expenses for enforcing and/or challenging the
patent.6
To highlight our intuition clearly, consider an extreme scenario in which the
patent allows the leader to establish a permanent monopoly. Within our setting,
such scenario can be established simply by assuming that the fixed-fee licence is
2Shapiro (2003, p. 71) refers as reverse payment to the cases in which the patent holder
makes a cash payment to the challenger, who in turn agrees not to enter the market until some
specified date. Leﬄer and Leﬄer (2003, p. 77) refer as lump sum patent settlements to the
cases in which private parties agree to establish a monopoly and share the profits. Gilbert and
Tom (2001) mention that quite typical agreements are those where the profits generated from the
patent holder are shared with the competitor for a specified period or permanently.
3A welfare analysis that takes into account the impact on consumers is beyond the scope of
this paper. We say an outcome is ‘eﬃcient’ if it is Pareto eﬃcient from the private point of view
of the two innovative firms.
4In fact, when players collude and the follower invests, the two firms lose the (shared) monopoly
profits and each receive duopoly profits. When demand has a negative slope, the variation of
profits (of the joint firms) is always smaller than the duopoly profit of a single firm. Therefore,
the cooperative threshold level of the follower must be bigger than the non-cooperative one.
Moreover, if the joint variation of profits from the follower’s entry is negative, then cooperation
would result in a permanent monopoly.
5To date, there are two dispute resolution rules, called first-to-file and first-to-invent, that may
determine which firm is granted the patent. The first-to-file rule, which applies in all countries
except the U.S., means that the patent issues to the first applicant independently of priority
of discovery. The first-to-invent rule, which applies in the U.S. will issue to the first inventor,
provided the date of first invention can be documented (see Scotchmer and Green (1990, p. 133-
134)). In our stylised model, as soon as the patent is granted to the first innovator that files an
application, investment occurs — they are simultaneously determined.
6Amongst others, see Crampes and Langinier (2002) and Lanjouw and Lerner (1997). The
administrative/legal costs simply create a gap between what the follower/licensee pays in order
to use the technology and what the leader/licensor receives. For a brief review of patent law, see
Shy (1995, Chapter 9).
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infinite. Ex-ante, both firms have the opportunity to file for the patent, but the first
mover gains the project value in its entirety, while the follower loses the investment
opportunity and remains empty-handed. With homogeneous firms the benefit of
delay is completely eliminated and entry occurs as soon as the investment payoﬀ
becomes marginally positive. When, ex-ante, firms can cooperate via a collusive
contract, the terms of the agreement will specify again the leader’s entry, the shar-
ing rule (the division of monopoly profits), and the follower’s entry (if, ex-ante,
convenient to both firms). In addition, when a duopoly is more profitable to both
firms, the patent holder will allow the follower to enter the market exempt of paying
the fixed-fee licence such that the follower’s entry is finite. If, for a high enough
level of the stochastic demand, the sum of the duopoly profits is higher than the
monopoly profits, then the duopoly market will be established via cooperation. In
this particular scenario, cooperation, again, delays innovation but competition is
restored.
There is a broad range of alternative cases (with finite fixed-fee licences) where
cooperative collusion accelerates competition. The model presented here identifies
the economic and firm-specific factors — fixed-fee licence, slope of demand, invest-
ment costs — that in a collusive scenario accelerate, rather than delay, competition.
Virtually all agree that some level of protection of intellectual property (IP) via
a patent is justified. However, it is also recognised that IP protection is a two-edged
sword. On the one hand, it encourages and rewards innovation. On the other hand,
it creates monopolies.7
Recognising, as we do, that in a patent framework, collusion does not necessarily
delay competition, may be a promising result in lessening the tension between
antitrust and IP authorities.8 This is particularly true for the new economy, well
characterised in our setting, where products are based on innovation and typically
involve large initial fixed sunk costs and low variable costs.9
Furthermore, one may notice that our approach to collusion reestablishes the
importance of a real option framework in market entry decision.10 According to
the real option theory, uncertainty creates an option value of delay, but with two
competing firms the fear of preemption undermines this approach. Moreover, a
patent-race may increase the preemption threat dramatically. For instance, in the
limiting case depicted above, when the patent allows the establishment of a perma-
nent monopoly, homogeneous firms will try to invest as soon as the project value
is marginally positive. Therefore, under such circumstances, investment occurs ac-
cording to the traditional net present value (NPV) rule. The core of the problem,
as argued by Weeds (2002), is that real options are rarely backed by legal contracts
7Within our setting, in the non-cooperative scenario, increases in the cost of the fixed-fee licence
paid by the follower delays the follower’s entry threshold and, hence, rewards the patent-holder
who enjoys monopoly profits over a longer period of time.
8See Pitofsky (2001) for a discussion on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) position with
respect to IP laws. For an overview of antitrust policy and related issues, see Kovacic and Shapiro
(2000) and Williamson (1987).
9For simplicity, it is assumed that there are only fixed-sunk costs and variable costs are zero.
10Bloom and Van Reenen (2002) mention that patents represent innovations whose introduc-
tion involve sizeable (and irreversible) investments, and when firms face uncertain market condi-
tions they will own patent real options, which reflect the value that a firm places on its ability to
choose the timing of its investment.
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which guarantee the holder’s rights in the same terms as financial options. More-
over, investment opportunities are rarely “de facto proprietary” (Weeds, 2002).11
Even when firms can file for a patent, in an ex-ante situation, the investment op-
portunity is still a non-proprietary option. In these circumstances, the investment
race is exacerbated by the patent race and the option value of delay is addition-
ally eroded. By contrast, in our model, ex-ante cooperation establishes a de facto
proprietary right similar to that granted by financial options.
In our analysis, cooperative collusion could take the explicit form of a horizontal
merger between firms facing the same market demand. At the practical level, the
model provides a simple and realistic framework which might help to explain the
recent wave of consolidations and alliances in the pharmaceutical industry.
As documented in several recent studies,12 some of the largest mergers in his-
tory have involved recent combinations of multinational pharmaceutical firms.13
Remarkable changes, such as an enormous number of mergers, joint ventures, and
other collusive arrangements are occurring in these markets.14 One the one hand,
the wave of consolidation may be a response to the development of new drugs and
other technologies. On the other hand, as mentioned in Balto and Mongoven (1999),
a crucial reason is the record number of patent expirations faced by the pharma-
ceutical industry during these years. According to our framework, the merging
scenario takes place before the patent is allocated to any of the two innovators,
when both are homogeneous.
It is worth emphasising the applicability of our approach to specific industries,
such as the pharmaceutical industry. We model collusion as an ex-ante opportunity
available to firms facing the same market. Nevertheless, it is diﬃcult at times to
determine whether a firm is a potential competitor in a relevant market. However,
the pharmaceutical industry, more than any other one, is uniquely suited for de-
tecting potential competition. As the required U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approval process for new drugs is transparent, and fairly predictable, phar-
maceutical companies are often able to determine the next entrants in the relevant
market segment. Although predictions about entry are not perfect, the approval
process provides a higher degree of certainty compared to other markets (see Balto
and Mongoven (1999)). Therefore the option to collude is usually available to
pharmaceutical companies well in advance of market entry.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next subsection revises
very briefly the relevant literature. Section 2 presents the model. In particular,
subsection 2.1 provides the general setting and assumptions. Subsection 2.2 shows
the non-collusive (competitive) equilibrium of the leader-follower Stackelberg game.
Subsection 2.3 formalises and derives the equilibrium of the cooperative scenario
by using a Nash axiomatic solution which enables the two firms to sign a long-term
collusive contract. Section 3 summarises and concludes.
11Weeds (2002, p. 729) refers to cases of strong market position such as natural monopoly and
network industry.
12See Whitener (1995) and Balto and Mongoven (1999).
13For instance, Zeneca’s acquisition of Astra, Hoechst’s acquisition of Marion Merrell Dow,
the merger between Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz and the merger between Glaxo Wellcome and Smith
Kline Beecham.
14This has raised the concern of the FTC, whose primary task is to guarantee a certain level of
competition. See Families USA (2003), FTC (2002a) and FTC (2002b) for an overview of lawsuits
against drug manufacturers.
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first model accounting for cooperative
collusion in a real options framework combined with strategic interaction.
1.1. Literature overview. Several eﬀorts have been made to analyse the inter-
action of IP protection and collusion. Unlike our study, vast part of this literature
focuses on ex-post collusion arising from post-patent conflicts in a non-stochastic
environment. More precisely, collusion takes the form of a patent litigation settle-
ment between a patent holder and a firm infringing and/or challenging the patent.15
The stochastic scenario, compared to the previous literature, allows us to stress the
advantage to collude particularly when firms are still homogeneous (both firms
are non-patent holders). That is, ex-ante collusion resolves the uncertainty over
the allocation of the patent and hence eliminates the preemption threat of the
investment-patent race. Therefore, cooperating, prior to filing for a patent, creates
an additional surplus which cannot arise in a deterministic framework.
The literature combining real options with strategic interactions is relatively
recent. As argued, our model extends the study of Smets (1991) and Dixit and
Pindyck (1994), who examine irreversible market entry for a duopoly facing a
stochastic demand. Non-cooperative behaviour results in an asymmetric leader-
follower equilibrium. This model has been extended in a number of dimensions.16
For example, Grenadier (1996) considers the strategic exercise of options applied
to real estate markets.17 Similarly as in Smets (1991), joint investment arises only
when the underlying stochastic process starts at a suﬃciently high initial value and,
even then, is not necessarily undertaken at the optimal point. In a two-player game,
with private information on each player’s exercise cost, Lambrecht and Perraudin
(2003) find threshold entry levels located between the monopoly and simple NPV
outcomes.
Reiss (1998) uses real-option-based valuation to determine whether and when a
firm should patent and adopt an innovation if the arrival time of competitors is
stochastic. In particular, he focuses on the optimal investment and patenting strat-
egy for a firm that has developed a new product or a close substitute beforehand.
Miltersen and Schwartz (2002) use a real option framework to investigate patent-
protected R&D investment projects when there is competition in the development
and marketing of the resulting product.18 In a similar vein, Schwartz (2003) uses
15For instance, amongst others, Marshall et al. (1994) model a litigation settlement as a bid-
and-protest game in non-stochastic contest and shows that the settlement may result in collusion.
Crampes and Langinier (2002) model a situation where the patent holder must supervise the
market and react in case of infringement, they use a Nash bargaining to determine the collusive
agreement. Ex-post collusive agreement through a Nash bargaining is used by Lanjouw and
Lerner (1997) and Aoki and Hu (1999) as well. See also Meurer (1989) and Rockett (1990). For a
detailed review of theoretical models on patent litigation versus patent settlement see Cooter and
Rubinfield (1989).
16For an overview, see for instance Grenadier (2000) and Schwartz and Trigeorgis (2001).
17The crucial diﬀerence between Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Grenadier (1996) is due to
the fact that Dixit and Pindyck assume firms enter a new market, therefore prior to entry both
innovative firms receive zero profits. More precisely, Grenadier models the entry decision as an
‘expansion decision’, that is, both firms are receiving a (non-stochastic) revenue prior to market
entry. This creates negative externalities from the leader to the follower.
18They find that competition in R&D not only increases production and reduces prices but also
shortens the time of developing the product and raises the probability of a successful development.
These benefits to society are countered by increased total investment costs in R&D and lower
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a simulation approach to value patents and patent-protected R&D projects based
on real options approach with applications to the pharmaceutical industry.
2. THE MODEL
2.1. Basic Assumptions. Two innovative firms face an identical investment op-
portunity consisting of a fixed technology which costs K19 and generates a single
unit of production. As in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), it is assumed that: i) there are
no variable costs, ii) the industry demand is suﬃciently elastic to ensure capacity
production, iii) agents are risk neutral, and iv) the risk-free interest rate is r.
The unit of production guarantees a continuous stream of revenues, with instan-
taneous level given by the inverse demand function
Rt = PtD (Qt) , (2.1)
where Qt is the total market supply at time t, D (·) is a diﬀerentiable function with
D0 (·) < 0 and Pt is a multiplicative demand shock. The shock evolves according
to a geometric Brownian motion
dP = µPdt+ σPdz, (2.2)
where µ and σ are the drift and the volatility of the process respectively, and dz is
a stochastic increment which follows a standard Wiener process.
Assuming that the two innovators are the only ones to access the investment
opportunity, the demand (net of the shock) D (Qt) , takes two values: i) D (Qt) =
D(1), shortly D1 if only one entrepreneur invests, or ii) D (Qt) = D(2), shortly D2
if both entrepreneurs invest. As demand is downward sloping, D2 will be strictly
less than D1.
It is assumed that the firm who innovates and becomes the first to file a patent
application is immediately granted a patent — the leader. The patent gives the
innovative firm the obligation to license the technology to the second entrant — the
follower.20 The fixed-fee licence paid by the follower, γF , is assumed to be a lump-
sum payment exogenously given.21 Usually, there are legal and/or administrative
costs for enforcing the patent and overseeing the licensing scheme, we assume that,
aggregate value of the R&D investment projects —a medical drug is used as an example for their
analysis (see Miltersen and Schwartz (2002, p. 30)).
19If production stops, it is assumed that the scrapping value is zero, so the cost K is sunk.
In other words, the cash flow will always be positive, hence, it will never be convenient to stop
producing after the initial investment. Moreover, as in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the investment
decisions of the model presented here possess three characteristics: i) they are irreversible, ii)
there is uncertainty over the future rewards from the investment, and iii) there is some scope
about the timing of the investment.
20Such a licensing scheme is known as ‘compulsory licensing’ and it is typically used as antitrust
remedy (see Scherer and Watal (2002)). After the 1994 “Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Regulation” (TRIPS) agreement, compulsory licensing has become an option available
to all WTO member nations.
21Alternatively, one could have modelled a bargaining over the licensing fee between the patent-
holder and the second entrant, where failure to negotiate results into a permanent monopoly.
However, it is intuitive that there could be no room for bargaining if the drop in the demand and/or
the investment cost are suﬃciently high. Moreover, an exogenous licensing fee may be consistent
with the TRIPS agreement, where compulsory licensing is triggered by failure to negotiate over
the licensing fee — Treaty of Marrakesh TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights) Article 13.
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after paying such costs, the leader — patent-holder — receives the residual part of
the licensing fee, namely γL. Additionally, it is assumed that the option to charge
the fixed-fee licence expires after the follower has invested and therefore cannot be
exercised later. When the right to charge for the licence is exercised by the leader,
the follower’s investment cost becomes K + γF , whilst the leader receives a lump-
sum payment γL with γL ≤ γF (being γL a share of γF ). In our case then, both
entrepreneurs cannot invest simultaneously since only the patent-holder is allowed
to invest first, whilst the rival will pay the fixed-fee licence.22
It is quite intuitive that the investment decisions of the two firms are interrelated
due to two factors: i) the negative slope of demand — which determines the drop of
revenues from the monopoly to the duopoly, and ii) the additional licensing cost,
γF , paid by the follower. Both factors determine a first mover’s advantage in a
non-cooperative scenario. Compared to Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the advantage
of the first mover is enhanced by the additional benefits from holding the patent.
Therefore, our setting extends Dixit and Pindyck’s investment race model into a
(simultaneous) patent/investment race situation. The next subsection solves our
non-cooperative entry game leading to an asymmetric leader-follower equilibrium.
2.2. Non-Cooperative Game: Leader-Follower Equilibrium. First, the play-
ers’ expected payoﬀs under our non-cooperative scenario of a leader-follower game
are derived. Second, the equilibrium strategy of the game is provided.
In the Stackelberg game, one innovative firm acts as leader — investing first at a
cost K and earning an instantaneous (monopolistic) revenue D1Pt(r−µ) — and the rival
will act as a follower. That is, the follower will delay investment and enter when
it is optimal to do so, and her/his entry will determine duopoly profits. When the
follower invests, the investment cost is either i) K + γF if the leader exercises the
option to charge the fixed-fee licence — at this point the leader would then receive a
one-oﬀ payment, γL; or ii) K if the leader does not exercise the option and allows
the follower to use the innovation freely.
An equilibrium strategy consists of an entry threshold, which is a given level of
the state variable that triggers the investment decision such that, given the other
firm’s strategy, neither agent has an incentive, in any state of the world, to deviate
from her/his strategy. As in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), it is assumed that an
equilibrium exists and an equilibrium strategy consists of two triggers, PL and PF ,
which denote the leader’s and the follower’s optimal entry, respectively.
As common in timing games, in order to derive an equilibrium, one can use
backwards induction. First, the investment problem of the follower after the leader
has invested is considered . Notice that, when the follower invests, the leader always
exercises the option to charge the follower the licensing fee, γF .
23
Given that the leader has invested and will exercise the option to charge for
her/his innovation, the follower, when investing at PF , has expected revenues equal
22Smets (1991), Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Grenadier (1996) assume that if both try to
invest simultaneously, one randomly selected, is allowed to do so. This assumption is a technical
one which can be used to solve coordination problems exogenously; it allows to identify the leader
and the follower in the case of simultaneous entry decision and avoid problems of coordination
failure resulting in joint investment when it is suboptimal to do so. See Huisman et al. (2002) for
an endogenous solution of the coordination problem.
23See Appendix 1.
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to D2PF(r−µ) and lump-sum costs K + γF . Therefore, the follower’s expected value,
F (P ), can be written as
F (Pt) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
F1 (Pt) =
h
D2PF
(r−µ) −K − γF
i ³
Pt
PF
´δ
if Pt < PF ,
F2 (Pt) = D2Pt(r−µ) −K − γF if Pt ≥ PF ,
(2.3)
with δ =
−
³
µ− σ22
´
+
q¡
µ− σ22
¢2
+ 2rσ2
σ2
> 1, (2.4)
where Pt is the initial level of the state variable and PF is the follower’s entry
trigger and δ is the positive root of the quadratic equation24
r − µδ − σ
2
2
δ(δ − 1) = 0.
Solving F1 (Pt) for the optimal PF yields
PF =
µ
δ
δ − 1
¶ ∙
(K + γF ) (r − µ)
D2
¸
. (2.5)
Working backwards, given the follower’s optimal entry, the leader’s expected
value can be derived as follows. Consider first the scenario where only one firm
had the opportunity to invest. In such a scenario, when the single firm invests at
Pt, the expected discounted payoﬀ would be equal to D1Pt(r−µ) −K (i.e. the payoﬀ in
a permanent monopoly). In our framework instead, as the follower invests at PF ,
the leader will i) lose the expected discounted (monopoly) revenues, D1PF(r−µ) , ii) earn
instead a competitive revenue, D2PF(r−µ) , and also iii) receive a lump-sum payment γL.
Therefore, the leader’s expected value, L(P ), can be written as
L(Pt) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
L1 (Pt) = D1Pt(r−µ) −K +
h
(D2−D1)PF
(r−µ) + γL
i ³
Pt
PF
´δ
if Pt < PF ,
L2 (Pt) = F2 (Pt) + γF + γL =
D2Pt
(r−µ) −K + γL if Pt ≥ PF .
(2.6)
In order to solve for the leaders’ investment trigger, PL, the argument runs
similar to Dixit and Pindyck (1994). If there is any incentive to be a leader, that
is, to invest when the state variable is below PF , it must be the case that the payoﬀ
from being the leader is greater or equal to the payoﬀ of being the follower. Then,
the optimal entry strategy for the leader must be such that at PL, the leader’s
payoﬀ is equal or marginally greater than the follower’s payoﬀ. This implies that
PL must be the root of the following equation
L1 (PL) = F1 (PL) . (2.7)
Though one cannot provide a closed form solution for PL,25 it is easy to see that
PL and PF are the equilibrium strategies of the Stackelberg game if and only if⎧
⎨
⎩
L1 (Pt) < F1 (Pt) for Pt < PL,
L1 (Pt) ≥ F1 (Pt) for PL ≤ Pt < PF ,
L2 (Pt) > F2 (Pt) for Pt ≥ PF ,
(2.8)
24We do not provide the derivation of the firm value through stochastic calculus. See Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) for a general analysis of entry and exit decisions under uncertainty.
25Notice, in fact, that PL is the root of a polynomial equation of degree δ.
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The former conditions imply that if, Pt < PL, the value of being the follower
exceeds the value of being the leader, therefore both players strictly prefer to delay
investment and be the follower. As soon as Pt crosses PL and remains below PF ,
both players prefer to be the leader. Therefore for PL ≤ Pt < PF , both firms would
try to invest, but only the patent-holder succeeds and becomes the leader. Hence,
the optimal decision for the follower is to delay investment until the state variable
has reached the threshold level PF .
Figure 1 shows the leader’s and follower’s claim values. The intersection between
F1 and L1 occurs when Pt = PL, which denotes the leader’s entry trigger. Regarding
the trigger level PF , the follower’s payoﬀs, F1, smooth-pastes the straight line F2.
Moreover, when the state variable starts at or above PF , both firms have the
same expected revenues, PtD2(r−µ) , but the gap between the leader’s and the follower’s
payoﬀ arises from the costs side. The leader’s net cost is equal to K − γL, whilst
the follower’s cost corresponds to K + γF . In fact, when simultaneous investment
would occur — the state variable starts above PF — only one firm wins the patent
race and therefore receives γL, whilst the rival firm pays the licensing cost, γF .
To fully understand the preemptive eﬀect of the patent, Figure 2 presents the
investment and trigger values depicted in Figure 1, together with the values of the
standard model described in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) — where γF is equal to zero.
The leader and follower values and their entry triggers, of the model by Dixit and
Pindyck, are denoted by the small case letters: l, f , pl and pf . As argued, when
a patent is granted to the first investor and licensed to the second one, the first
mover advantage increases proportionally to the licensing fees. Therefore, each
firm’s ability to delay is additionally undermined by the fear of preemption. Under
a patent-licensing scheme, PL is always below pl, therefore, the market entry by
the leader is accelerated and the innovation is marketed sooner. This result might
not seem surprising. As commonly held, by rewarding innovators, IP protection
should accelerate innovation. What we want to emphasise here is that it is true
that innovation is delivered to the market at an early stage, however, when firms are
ex-ante homogeneous, the acceleration results from a preemption war (fear) more
than a rewarding scenario. Consistently, in our extension of Dixit and Pindyck’s
model, the follower’s entry and, hence the competitive stage, is delayed due to the
additional licensing cost, that is pf < PF .
2.3. Cooperative Scenario: Nash Axiomatic Approach. This subsection
analyses an alternative scenario where, instead of competing in a Stackelberg game,
players cooperate by signing a long-term state contingent contract which defines
the rules of collusion. It is organised as follows. First, the cooperative scenario
is formalised through a symmetric Nash axiomatic bargaining; and second, the
equilibrium payoﬀs are derived.
2.3.1. Nash Axiomatic Bargaining. Since the technology is fixed, collusion through
market quotas or product diﬀerentiation is not feasible. Therefore, if limiting the
supply to one unit is convenient, collusion can only take the form of a monopoly
situation, with one innovator investing and sharing profits with the other one who
remains idle.
Moreover, colluding via a monopoly can be beneficial to both innovators as a
temporary stage. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that demand might be suﬃ-
ciently elastic. If this is the case, for suﬃciently high levels of the state variable,
10 BRECCIA & SALGADO-BANDA
the sum of the values of the two innovative firms in duopoly might be greater
than the value of one monopolistic firm (in which case, a duopoly market might
be convenient for high levels of the stochastic demand). For low levels of the state
variable the reverse situation applies, which is, monopoly is more convenient than
competition and therefore it might be established as a temporary situation.
In order to embody all possible benefits from cooperation, players are allowed
to sign an agreement where the terms of the contract define the rule to share the
monopolistic profit (whilst one innovative firm invests and the other stays idle),
and also the duration of the monopoly scenario, that is, the termination of the
contract. Therefore, our cooperative framework is conveniently flexible and able to
capture situations where cooperation might lead to a permanent monopoly (where
the agreed duration of the contract is infinite) or, a temporary one (where the
duration of the contract is finite).
Three features of the contract will be agreed on:
i) the timing of collusion — the level of the state variable at which one innova-
tive firm invests and starts sharing profits with the idle one. This entry trigger is
referred to as fPL, meaning that one innovative firm invests as soon as the state
variable, Pt, crosses the cooperative trigger fPL;
ii) the partition of the collusive gains, that is, the share of the instantaneous rev-
enues, λ, retained by the monopolist and the residual share, 1− λ, paid to the idle
innovator;
iii) the termination of the contract, that is, the level of the state variable at which
the idle innovative firm is allowed to invest by paying the lump-sum costsK without
any additional cost. Corresponding to this trigger level, the (former) monopolist
stops sharing the revenues. This entry trigger is referred to as fPF .
The environment is cooperative, which implies that players can commit and
stick to their promises. Therefore, the bargaining situation is solved by using a
symmetric Nash axiomatic approach, where fPL, fPF and λ, are the unknowns of the
bargaining problem.
Briefly, the Nash bargaining can be abstractly understood as a situation where
two individuals have the opportunity to share a ‘pie’ of size one, for instance, by
making simultaneous demands to a referee.26 If the demands are feasible — they
sum to one — agreement is reached, the pie is split according to the demands and
the game is over. Otherwise, if the demands exceed the size of the pie, the game
terminates without an agreement and players receive their disagreement payoﬀ. It
has been shown that the Nash bargaining solution, is the unique solution satisfying
various axioms, one of which is Pareto eﬃciency.
In order to define the disagreement payoﬀs of the Nash axiomatic approach, the
equilibrium payoﬀs of the Stackelberg game, previously derived, are used — they
represent the payoﬀs in the non-cooperative environment.
As argued, the problem consists of solving the bargaining situation for the un-
known terms of the contracts, fPL, fPF and λ. It has been proved that players will
agree on a contract which maximises the product of players’ surplus — the diﬀerence
between the agreement and the disagreement payoﬀ — referred to as Nash product.27
26In more detail, each player proposes a partition of the ‘pie’ to a referee, and he does so
without knowing the other player’s demand.
27See Nash (1950).
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The Nash product, in our case, corresponding to the symmetric demand game
can be written as28 ³eL− d´³ eF − d´ , (2.9)
where the agreement payoﬀs for the monopolist and the idle entrepreneur are,
respectively
eL = "λD1fPL
(r − µ) −K
#µ
PtfPL
¶δ
+ (D2 − λD1)
" fPF
(r − µ)
#µ
PtfPF
¶δ
, (2.10)
eF = " (1− λ)D1fPL
(r − µ)
#µ
PtfPL
¶δ
+
(
[D2 − (1− λ)D1]
Ã fPF
(r − µ)
!
−K
)µ
PtfPF
¶δ
,
(2.11)
and d is the disagreement payoﬀ for each player. As fPL, fPF and λ are the max-
imisers of the Nash product, one can write³fPL, fPF , λ´ = argmax³eL− d´³ eF − d´ . (2.12)
As mentioned, the disagreement payoﬀs are derived from the non-cooperative
scenario where players compete in a Stackelberg game.
We know that, if players try to file for a patent at the same time, with probability
1/2 one succeeds, whilst the other will (optimally) delay investment and become the
follower. Hence, if no agreement is reached at a cooperative stage, with probability
1/2, each player will become the leader or the follower in the Stackelberg game.
Therefore, ex-ante, in a pre-patent/investment situation, players are homogeneous
and therefore they have identical disagreement payoﬀs which are given by
d =
F (Pt) + L(Pt)
2
. (2.13)
2.3.2. Equilibrium Payoﬀs. Here we provide the equilibrium contract of the coop-
erative game, that is, the level of fPL, fPF and λ that maximise the Nash product.
By maximising (2.12) with respect to fPL, fPF and λ, the following system of
equations are obtained from the first order conditions
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂hL/∂iPL
(hL−d)
+ ∂
hF/∂iPL
( hF−d)
= 0,
∂hL/∂iPF
(hL−d)
+ ∂
hF//∂iPF
( hF−d)
= 0,
∂hL/∂λ
(hL−d)
+ ∂
hF/∂λ
( hF−d)
= 0.
(2.14)
By noticing that
∂eL/∂λ = " D1fPL
(r − µ)
#µ
PtfPL
¶δ
−
"
D1fPF
(r − µ)
#µ
PtfPF
¶δ
= −∂ eF/∂λ, (2.15)
one can easily rearrange the FOC as follows
28An extension of the Nash axiomatic problem to the case where the ‘pie’ is driven by a
geometric Brownian motion is due to Perraudin and Psillaki (1999).
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⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∂eL/∂fPL + ∂ eF/∂fPL = 0,
∂eL/∂fPF + ∂ eF/∂fPF = 0,eL = eF. (2.16)
The first two equations capture the Pareto eﬃciency of the Nash axiomatic
solution. In fact, it is evident from the first two conditions that fPL and fPF maximise
the overall agreement payoﬀ, shortly (AP ), where AP = eL + eF .29 Therefore, as
argued by Perraudin and Psillaki (1999), one can refer to these two conditions as
eﬃciency conditions. The third condition, eL = eF , simply shows that the game is
perfectly symmetric in terms of bargaining power and disagreement payoﬀs. The
fact that players are identical in the negotiation as well as in disagreement implies
that they will agree on splitting the pie in half. Therefore, not surprisingly, the
Nash bargaining provides players with identical payoﬀs.
Furthermore, it is interesting to notice that the state variable, Pt, drops out
of the first order conditions. This result is not surprising in our setting where
players bargain ex-ante over future cash flows and do not receive any current cash
flow before bargaining. Intuitively, when bargaining occurs ex-ante,30 looking at
the definition of eL, eF and d the current level of the state variable enters in the
bargaining problem (2.12) only via stochastic discount factors of the form (Pt/P )δ
where P represents any of the trigger levels: PL, PF (appearing in the definition of
d), P˜L or P˜F (appearing in the definitions of eL and eF ). Therefore, the maximum
of the Nash product is aﬀected by Pt only via a multiplicative shock of the form
P δt and this eliminates the dependence on Pt from the first order conditions.
31 In
other words, the stationary nature of the Nash problem in our setting is due to the
fact that players are bargaining over option values.
Solving the above system for the three unknowns —gPL, fPF and λ — yields the
following equations
fPL = µ δδ − 1
¶ ∙
K (r − µ)
D1
¸
, (2.17)
fPF = µ δδ − 1
¶ ∙
K (r − µ)
max{2D2 −D1, 0}
¸
, (2.18)
λ =
1
2
+
µ
δ − 1
2δ
¶"
1− (fPL/fPF )δ
1− (fPL/fPF )δ−1
#
, (2.19)
which represent the agreed terms of the equilibrium contract.
First, note that, as long as D2 < D1, then fPL < fPF . This implies that a collusive
monopoly will always be established and it will persist as long as the state variable
(starts and) remains below fPF .
In the limiting case, where demand is infinitely elastic, and, hence, D1 = D2,
then fPL = fPF . In this scenario, cooperation is still beneficial in that players can
agree to allocate ex-ante the patent and not to charge for the licence. In this case,
29See Appendix 2.
30That is, none of the players has invested yet.
31Simply factorise the Nash product with respect to the term P δt .
COMPETING OR COLLUDING IN A STOCHASTIC ENVIRONMENT 13
there is simultaneous entry, and the entry threshold becomes
fPL = fPF = µ δδ − 1
¶ ∙
K (r − µ)
D1
¸
. (2.20)
Notice that, according to the above entry trigger, when cooperating, each firm
can maximise the option value to invest, and the preemption threat — which is due
to the presence of a patent — is fully eliminated.
In addition, one can notice that, if max{2D2 − D1, 0} = 0, that is, if 2D2 ≤
D1, then fPF = ∞. This result implies that the contract establishes a permanent
‘collusive monopoly’.
With regard to the sharing rule, λ, one can notice that this is purely determined
by the slope of demand curve (D1 and D2) and the term δ, whilst the investment
cost, K, does not play any role.32
Last, by some simple algebra, one can verify that, for D2 taking values between
(0,D1), the share λ is always ∈
£
1
2 +
δ−1
2δ , 1
¤
. In fact, when
D2 → D1 then λ→
1
2
+
µ
δ − 1
2δ
¶µ
δ
δ − 1
¶
= 1,
whilst when
D2 → 0 then λ→
1
2
+
δ − 1
2δ
.
Stackelberg and Cooperative Equilibrium: A Comparison
Here, we provide a comparison between the cooperative equilibrium and the Stack-
elberg one. The purpose is, first, to stress the (Pareto) ineﬃciency generated in
the leader-follower equilibrium in comparison with the Nash bargaining solution.
Second, we will determine under what circumstances collusion accelerates the es-
tablishment of a duopoly instead of delaying it.
Given the Nash equilibrium entry triggers, fPL and fPF , and the Stackelberg ones
PL and PF , it is immediate to notice that the ineﬃciency of the non-cooperative
scenario simply reflects the fact that the agreement payoﬀ is always greater than
the disagreement payoﬀ. A deeper analysis of the agreement and (Stackelberg)
disagreement payoﬀ clearly shows the source of ineﬃciency. The agreement payoﬀ,
AP , can be written as the sum of two functions, say M(·) and C(·, ·), which are
evaluated as follows
M(fPL) = ÃD1fPLr − µ −K
!µ
PtfPL
¶δ
, (2.21)
and
C(fPF ,K) = "(2D2 −D1)Ã fPFr − µ
!
−K
#µ
PtfPF
¶δ
. (2.22)
32Formally, the term K cancels out in the ratio hPL/ hPF . Intuitively, K does not aﬀect the
sharing rule because both firms pay the same investment cost. Nevertheless, under cooperation,
one firm invests and pays K earlier than the idle firm. Therefore, the relative discount factor
(which depends on δ and the slope of demand) determines the asymmetry of the sharing rule.
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Similarly, the overall disagreement payoﬀ, say DP = 2d, can be written as the
sum of the two functions, M(·) and C(·, ·), evaluated as follows
M(PL) =
µ
D1PL
r − µ −K
¶µ
Pt
PL
¶δ
, (2.23)
and
C(PF ,K + γF − γL) =
∙
(2D2 −D1)
µ
PF
r − µ
¶
−K − (γF − γL)
¸µ
Pt
PF
¶δ
.
It is easy now to notice that33
M(fPL) ≥M(PL) and C(fPF ,K) > C(PF ,K + γF − γL). (2.24)
The first inequality captures a first source of ineﬃciency. This is due to early
entry of the leader in the Stackelberg game, where an optimal investment decision,
like fPL, would be pre-empted.34
Another source of ineﬃciency is captured by the second inequality which refers
to the entry in the competitive stage. In the Stackelberg game, the follower’s invest-
ment decision depends on γF and D2. Regardless of the initial level of demand, the
follower will invest at PF by paying the additional cost γF . The follower will invest
even if the drop in demand is such that 2D2 −D1 ≤ 0, that is, if the value of the
two running businesses is lower than the monopolistic one. Therefore, intuitively,
the ineﬃciency results from the fact that D1 does not play any role in the follower’s
entry trigger.
Lastly, as already argued, all ineﬃciencies are waived via cooperation by the fact
that fPL and fPF maximise the agreement payoﬀ AP . This can be re-formalised asnfPL, fPF , γ = 0o = arg max
Pl,Pf ,γ
M(Pl) + C(Pf ,K + γ), (2.25)
where the term γ = 0 simply highlights the fact that in the cooperative framework
the additional cost γF is not borne. In a way, the former consideration stresses
that, through cooperation, players maximise the investment value in both the initial
monopolistic stage and in the competitive one.35 This can be simply rephrased by
saying that players maximise the ‘project’ value by choosing the optimal scale of
the investment through a state-contingent contract.
We conclude this section by comparing the entry triggers of the cooperative game
and the leader-follower game.
As argued, fPL corresponds to the entry trigger level of the standard leader-
follower model (without patent) where the leadership is exogenously allocated.
Therefore, not surprisingly, fPL must necessarily be greater than PL which is deter-
mined under the threat of preemption. This result simply underlines that cooper-
ation restores the option value of delaying investment until an optimal entry.
33See Appendix 3.
34One can see that the Nash entry level iPL also corresponds to the optimal entry trigger of a
Stackelberg game where the role of the leader and that of the follower are exogenously allocated. In
this case, the leader would make the optimal investment decision by maximising her/his expected
payoﬀ. This is given by L1(Pt/P )δ , with L1 evaluated at P . Therefore, the first order condition
yields argmaxP L1(Pt/P )δ = iPL. See Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
35Or, also, one could say that players minimise the loss from competition. Notice that whenever
2D2 < D1— competition would generate a loss to the firms collectively — players will commit to
establish a permanent monopoly.
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Regarding fPF , this cooperative entry level is not necessarily greater than PF .
One can notice that, depending on the investment cost, the slope of the demand
and the fixed-fee licence, cooperation can accelerate competition (the establishment
of duopoly). When fPF is finite, that is 2D2 > D1, then, by some simple algebra,
one can verify that the following condition holds:
fPF < PF if and only if K µ D1 −D2
2D2 −D1
¶
< γF with 2D2 > D1,
which can be rearranged as
fPF < PF ↔ KγF < 1³D1
D2
− 1
´ − 1 with D1
D2
∈ (1, 2). (2.26)
We conclude that the above inequality is more likely to hold for i) a low ratio K/γF
and ii) low ratio D1/D2, that is high elasticity of demand.
Figures 3 and 4 show two scenarios in which cooperation results either in a
permanent monopoly (Figure 3) or in a temporary one (Figure 4). In particular,
Figure 3 compares the Nash bargaining solution with the leader-follower equilib-
rium. The AP line represents the agreement payoﬀ, whilst the DP line represents
the overall disagreement payoﬀ — the sum of the leader’s and the follower’s payoﬀs.
The cooperative entry trigger, fPL, is delayed by cooperation with respect to the
non-cooperative one, PL. In this case, a monopolistic firm is more profitable than
two joint duopolistic firms (i.e. 2D2 < D1); therefore fPF tends to infinity and
cooperation establishes a permanent monopoly. By contrast, Figure 4 shows that
for suﬃciently high levels of the state variable, it is advantageous to let the idle
innovative firm enter the market because 2D2 > D1. Moreover, in this case, condi-
tion (2.26) is satisfied, therefore fPF < PF and cooperation accelerates competition
instead of delaying or eliminating it.
3. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analysed, in a real option framework, the eﬀects of cooperative
collusion on a duopoly market protected by a patent. A patent is granted to the
first innovator/investor (who files the patent application) and the innovation is
licensed to the second entrant. Unlike previous studies on collusion, by introduc-
ing uncertainty through a stochastic demand, we find that cooperative collusion
does not necessarily delay competition. Collusion always delays market entry and
therefore innovation; depending on a number of economic factors, collusion may
accelerate the establishment of a duopoly. If firms can cooperate before facing a
patent/investment race, they can agree on sharing monopoly profits until one mo-
nopolistic firm generates higher profits than two firms. Moreover, when two firms
generate higher joint profits than one monopolistic firm, then, ex-ante, players can
cooperatively allocate the patent and agree not to enforce the licensing fee. We
have shown that depending on the elasticity of demand, the fixed-fee licence and
the investment costs, collusion can accelerate duopoly. In particular, this occurs
when the elasticity of demand is high and/or the ratio of the investment cost to the
licensing fee is low. This finding may be a promising result in lessening the tension
between antitrust and IP laws.
Furthermore, the cooperative environment under uncertainty helps to identify
two sources of ineﬃciency generated in the preemption game. First, the preemption
16 BRECCIA & SALGADO-BANDA
threat in the non-cooperative game accelerates the market entry by the leader when
sub-optimal. The higher the licensing fee, the more the option value of delay will
be eroded. In other words, as the advantage of the first mover increases with the
fixed-fee licence, each firm’s ability to delay is additionally undermined by the fear
of preemption. The second source of ineﬃciency is determined by the fact that the
follower’s investment decision is not aﬀected by the level of the revenues generated
during monopoly. That is, the follower invests regardless of the drop of revenues (of
the two firms collectively) generated by her/his entry decision. Therefore, under
cooperation, Pareto eﬃciency is achieved via: i) eliminating the preemption threat
by resolving the uncertainty over the allocation of the patent, which restores the
option value of delay and reestablishes the importance of the real option framework
in a market entry decision, and ii) maximising the joint project value by choosing
the optimal scale of the investment.
Lastly, the model provides a simple and realistic framework, which may help in
at explaining the recent wave of consolidations and alliances in the pharmaceutical
industry. A crucial reason is the record number of patent expirations faced by the
pharmaceutical industry during these years. According to our setting, in the pre-
patent situation when firms are still homogeneous, the collusive scenario is most
likely to occur, especially if firms can detect potential competitors in advance.
Moreover, the transparency of the FDA approval process for new drugs makes
the pharmaceutical industry uniquely suited for detecting potential competition.
Therefore, the option to collude is usually available to pharmaceutical companies
well in advance to market entry.
APPENDIX
Appendix 1 We assume that the leader has already invested. The follower’s
entry decision and the leader’s decision about charging for the use of the innovation
can be described in the following bimatrix game, where the leader is the row player
and the follower is the column player.
Follower
Invest Wait
Leader Exercise D2Pt(r−µ) + γL,
D2Pt
(r−µ) −K − γF Repeat Game
Not Exercise D2Pt(r−µ) ,
D2Pt
(r−µ) −K Repeat Game
If the follower delays investment then the game is repeated because the leader
retains the option to exercise the licence fee in the future, and the option expires
immediately after the follower has invested.
Assume that there exists a finite threshold, P¯ = sup{Pf}, where Pf is the
follower’s set of stopping strategies, and at Pt = P¯ , D2Pt(r−µ) −K−γF > 0. According
to this, there exists a stopping time τF , such that τF = {inf t ≥ 0; Pt ≥ P¯} <∞.
When the game reaches t = τF , the follower can guarantee a payoﬀ equal to zero
by never investing. Therefore he/she will strictly prefer to invest regardless of the
leader strategy, because in the worst case scenario, he/she can guarantee a payoﬀ
greater than zero, that is, D2Pt(r−µ)−K−γF > 0. When the follower invests the leader
always exercises his option as long as γL > 0. ¤
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Appendix 2 Grouping the derivative operator in the first two equations in
(2.16) (
∂(eL+ eF )/∂ ePL = 0,
∂(eL+ eF )/∂ ePF = 0,
and using the fact that eL+ eF is the overall agreement payoﬀ, implies that in the Nash
bargaining, players reach an agreement such that the terms of the contract, ePL andePF , maximise the value of the ‘pie’ they are going to split, therefore guaranteeing
the Pareto Eﬃciency. ¤
Appendix 3 This appendix proves that
M( ePL) ≥M(PL) and C( ePF ,K) > C(PF ,K + γF − γL),
where M(·) and C(·, ·) have been defined as follows
M(PL) =
µ
D1PL
r − µ −K
¶µ
Pt
PL
¶δ
,
and
C(PF ,K + γF − γL) =
∙
(2D2 −D1)
µ
PF
r − µ
¶
−K − (γF − γL)
¸µ
Pt
PF
¶δ
.
It is easy to show that the above inequalities hold by noticing that the triggersePL and ePF are the maximisers of M(·) and C(·, ·) respectively. In fact, the first
order conditions lead to
∂M(P )
∂P
= 0→ P =
µ
δ
δ − 1
¶
K(r − µ)
D1
= ePL,
∂C(P,K)
∂P
= 0→ P =
µ
δ
δ − 1
¶
K(r − µ)
max{2D2 −D1, 0} =
ePF ,
with second order conditions resulting into
∂2M(P )
∂P 2
< 0,
∂2C(P,K)
∂P 2
< 0 iﬀ 2D2 −D1 > 0.
Therefore, being ePL and ePF the maximisers of M(·) and C(·, ·) and noticing
that the term γF − γL is positive, one can conclude that the following inequalities
should hold
M( ePL) = max
P
M(P ) ≥M(PL)
C( ePF ,K) = max
P
C(P,K) ≥ C(PF ,K) > C(PF ,K + γF − γL). ¤
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Figure 1. Leader-Follower Equilibrium.
COMPETING OR COLLUDING IN A STOCHASTIC ENVIRONMENT 21
Figure 2. Leader-Follower Equilibrium: With and Without Patent.
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Figure 3. Cooperative Collusion via Permanent Monopoly.
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Figure 4. Cooperative Collusion via Temporary Monopoly.
